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This paper examines the impact of a large supply-side education intervention in the Philippines, the Third 
Elementary Education Project, on students’ national achievement test scores. We find that the program 
significantly increased student test scores at grades 4 to 6. The estimate indicates that the six-year 
exposure to the program increases test scores by about 15 score points. Interestingly, the mathematics 
score is more responsive to this education reform than other subjects. We also find that textbooks, 
instructional training of teachers, and new classroom constructions particularly contributed to these 
outcomes. The empirical results also imply that early-stage investments improve student performance at 
later stages in the elementary school cycle, which suggests that social returns to such an investment are 
greater than what the current study demonstrates.  
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Early-stage investments are increasingly recognized as a critical input in human capital production. These 
investments in the formation of human capital have dynamic impacts on outcomes at subsequent stages. 
Recent literature demonstrates that prenatal and early childhood nutrition status significantly determines a 
child’s readiness for schooling and educational and labor market outcomes (Alderman et al. 2001; 
Alderman, Hoddinott, and Kinsey 2006; Maluccio et al. 2009; Yamauchi 2008). The dynamic path of 
human capital formation depends on early-stage investments essentially due to the cumulative nature of 
its formation (Cunha et al. 2006).  
School education is not an exception. For instance, children cannot perform well at higher grades 
without sufficient acquisition of knowledge at lower grades. The high rates often observed of repeating 
early grades in elementary school show that many children face difficulty in successfully starting 
schooling, indirectly proving the importance of initial-stage investments in determining higher grade 
performance (Behrman and Deolalikar 1991). Similarly, successful completion at the elementary school 
stage is a significant factor in student performance at the secondary school stage.  
This paper assesses the impact of a large-scale intervention to elementary schools, the Third 
Elementary Education Project (TEEP), on students’ learning performance in the Philippines. The project 
was implemented by the Philippine Department of Education from 2000 to 2006 with financial assistance 
from the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) and the World Bank. The unique nature of 
TEEP was in the combination of physical and soft components and institutional reform. Besides investing 
in physical buildings and textbooks, TEEP provided training to teachers and principals and introduced 
school-based management by partnering school with community. Our study estimates the total impacts of 
these investments and reforms on students’ learning performance, measured by a change in student test 
scores during the elementary school cycle, although we expect that such an intervention has longer term 
effects beyond this stage, changing their activities in labor markets.
1  
Methodologically, we combine double differences with propensity score matching. We compare 
the change in test scores before and after the intervention in TEEP-treated schools with the change in 
nontreated schools. Propensity score matching is used to reduce the pre-intervention differences between 
the treated and nontreated schools. We find that a two-year exposure to the TEEP intervention 
significantly increased test scores in grade 4. Our estimates show that test scores increased by 4 to 5 score 
points (out of 100) from grades 4 to 6, which amounts to an increase of about 12–15 score points if 
students are exposed to the intervention for six years of elementary school education (grades 1 to 6). We 
also examine the effects of individual components of TEEP and find that school building constructions 
and renovations, instructional training of teachers, and additional textbook provision significantly 
increased student test scores. Interestingly, investments in textbooks for earlier grades have large positive 
effects on student performance at higher grades.  
The paper is organized as follows: The next section describes the program. Sections 3 and 4 
discuss data used in our analysis and our estimation method, respectively. Section 5 discloses the average 
treatment effects. The empirical results are summarized in Section 6. Section 7 concludes. 
                                                       
1 We collect individual and household data from 3,500 students in four TEEP and four non-TEEP divisions to study long-
term impacts of TEEP. This component includes tracking the sample students who migrated out of their original communities.   
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2.  PROGRAM BACKGROUND 
The Third Elementary Education Project (TEEP) was implemented from 2000 to 2006 by the Philippine 
Department of Education in all public primary and elementary schools
2 in the 23 provinces
3 identified as 
the most socially depressed in the Social Reform Agenda.
4 The total project cost was US$221.16 ($91.07 
million from JBIC and $82.84 million from World Bank, $47.25 from the Philippine government). The 
unique feature of TEEP is a combination of investments in school facility and education materials and 
school governance reform. Not only were school facilities and textbook supply improved, but the 
decisionmaking process was also decentralized to the school and community levels. TEEP introduced a 
package of investments to schools in the selected 23 provinces. Specifically, the package of investments 
included (1) school building construction and renovation, (2) textbooks, (3) teacher training, (4) school-
based management, and (5) other facility and equipment support.  
The core of the program is school-based management, through which schools are given an 
incentive to manage proactively and more independently of the government. Schools were partnered with 
communities and parents to decide key issues, such as improvement plans and school finance. Teachers 
were also trained systematically to improve teaching skills. Information management is being improved 
so that schools are responsible for systematically organizing information on enrollment, learning 
achievements, finance, and so forth, and reporting it to the division office. Schools are required to set 
improvement plans every year and compare them with actual achievement. This dynamic process is 
monitored by the division-level education department. School finance is also being decentralized to some 
extent to relax the school budget constraints because Philippine public schools are not allowed to charge 
school fees. TEEP schools are free to raise their own funds from communities, parents, and others, 
although resources are admittedly limited in many poor communities. These reforms in public schools are 
expected to improve education quality, which would then in turn increase returns to schooling in labor 
markets (see Yamauchi [2005] on returns to schooling).  
The selection of TEEP provinces was purposive because it intended to cover the most depressed 
provinces identified in the Social Reform Agenda. TEEP allocation is rather different in the Philippines’ 
three macroregions. As shown in Figure 2.1, in the northern macroregion of Luzon, TEEP was 
concentrated in the Cordillera Administrative Region, a mountainous region in the center of northern 
Luzon. In the central macroregion of Visayas, TEEP divisions were relatively evenly distributed. In the 
southern Mindanao macroregion, TEEP divisions were clustered, although not as clustered as in northern 
Luzon. 
TEEP was initially designed to follow a phase-in plan with three batches at the province level. 
However, the plan was altered in practice due to variations in preparedness across divisions. Because 
understanding the implementation process of TEEP is important in choosing the appropriate strategy to 
identify the TEEP impacts, we collected school-level data on program implementation time and 
investment amounts of different components. The data confirm that actual implementation did not follow 
the batch plan and suggest that the first and second batches were implemented almost simultaneously.
5 
We will describe TEEP implementation in more detail in the data section. 
                                                       
2 Primary schools cover grades 1 to 4, while elementary schools cover grades 1 to 6. 
3 The program covered both primary (grades 1–4) and elementary (grades 1–6) schools. This paper analyzes the impacts on 
only elementary schools. However, converting primary schools to elementary schools by extending enrollment up to grade 6 was 
also an important part of the TEEP program. Students who complete primary schools are likely to attend elementary schools in 
grades 5 and 6, which changes the student body of those schools between grades 1–4 and grades 5 and 6. 
4 The Ramos administration, along with their medium-term development plan, called Philippines 2000, identified reforms as 
the key to bridging social gaps and alleviating poverty. The objective of enhancing development through social reforms led to the 
formulation of the blueprint for social development in the Philippines, the Social Reform Agenda (SRA), marked as the first 
instance of social reforms in the history of the Philippines (Ramos 1995). As a result of the initial success of the SRA, the 
Congress of the Philippines in 1998 passed Republic Act 8425, widely known as the Social Reform and Poverty Alleviation Act 
(Republic of the Philippines, Congress, 1998). The law institutionalized the poverty alleviation program and a host of grassroots 
development strategies.  
5 Khattri, Ling, and Jha (2010) used the lag between the first and second batches to identify the effect of school-based  
3 
Figure 2.1—Map of TEEP and non-TEEP divisions in the Philippines (TEEP areas are in black) 
 
Source: Authors’ calculation. 
                                                                                                                                                                           
management on student test scores. Their analysis also includes TEEP investments such as new constructions as exogenous 
controlling variables. Their identification strategy is questionable, given that, in reality, the initial phase plan was changed due to 
variations in preparedness across divisions.   
4 
3.  DATA 
This section describes the data used in our analysis. We combine the official test and school databases and 
the investment data that we collected in the (TEEP) divisions. For test scores and school conditions at the 
start of the project, we use the National Achievement Test (NAT) score data and the Basic Education 
Information System (BEIS) data, respectively. The NAT data provide average test scores for grade 4 
students in school year (SY) 2002/03, grade 5 in SY 2003/04, and grade 6 in SY 2004/05 for each school. 
We note that grade 4 in SY 2002/03, grade 5 in SY 2003/04, and grade 6 in SY 2004/05 constitute panel 
data that tracked the same cohort in each school. 
Table 3.1 shows the mean and standard deviation of mathematics and overall scores of the cohort 
in SY 2002/03 and SY 2004/05 for TEEP and non-TEEP areas, separately. TEEP schools have higher 
average scores than non-TEEP schools in both years.  
Table 3.1—Summary of NAT test scores for TEEP and non-TEEP, SY 2002/03 and SY 2004/05 
  TEEP    Non-TEEP 
  SY 2002/03    SY 2004/05    SY 2002/03    SY 2004/05 
  Mean 
Standard 
deviation    Mean 
Standard 
deviation    Mean 
Standard 
deviation    Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
Overall score  46.975  14.674    63.712  13.431    44.447  13.515    59.795  12.875 
Math score  48.390  17.961    66.035  16.624    45.823  16.753    62.208  16.698 
Number of observations  1,774    1,774    2,434    2,434 
Source: National Achievement Test database, various years. 
The BEIS data provide detailed information on student enrollment and achievements and teachers 
since SY 2002/03. The data normally disaggregate the information by grade, age, and gender.
6  
We obtain income data on municipalities (or school district) from the 2000 Census. Local income 
level is an important factor that determines school and family environments. Controlling local income 
levels is crucial because competition between public and private schools matters in the selection of 
students in the Philippine context. In high-income municipalities (school districts), students from well-off 
families and with high test scores are likely to be accepted into private schools. Therefore, we expect 
differences in the ability distribution in public schools between high- and low-income municipalities. If 
school quality and student ability are complementary, the effect of TEEP on NAT change is expected to 
be different between high- and low-income districts. 
We assigned an income category to each school district based on the 2000 Census. The census 
defined income category (ranking from 1, highest, to 6, lowest) for each municipality.
7 Note that some 
municipalities are split into a few school districts. In cities, we ranked school districts as 1 based on the 
income threshold used for municipalities. TEEP was implemented not randomly but in the divisions 
identified as socially most depressed in the presidential Social Reform Agenda. Figure 3.1 shows the 
distribution of school districts by income category in TEEP and non-TEEP groups. School districts are 
concentrated in income categories 1, 4, and 5—that is, the highest income and the two lowest income 
rankings—for both TEEP and non-TEEP. Although we observe that more school districts are in income 
category 4 (and fewer in 1) in the TEEP group than in the non-TEEP group, the difference does not look 
                                                       
6 BEIS data needed intensive programming to transform for analysis. The data were originally in Microsoft Excel. The 
computer program needed about 10 hours to reorganize school-level data in different divisions and regions for one school year.  
7 The income classification of municipalities (municipality income) used in this paper is based on Republic of the 
Philippines, Department of Finance (2001), Department Order No. 32-01 (effective November 20, 2001) and Census 2000. The 
income categories for 1,435 municipalities are defined as follows: 1: Philippine peso (PHP) 35 million (M) or more (number of 
municipalities: 130); 2: PHP 27M or more but less than PHP 35M (140); 3: PHP 21M or more but less than PHP 27M (204); 4: 
PHP 13M or more but less than PHP 21M (543); 5: PHP 7M or more but less than PHP 13M (401); 6: less than PHP 7M (17).   
5 
significant. Further, Figure 3.2 shows the distribution of schools in the TEEP and non-TEEP groups. Our 
basic observation remains valid here. Therefore, it is likely that we can find (and compare) school districts 
that share similar socioeconomic conditions in both TEEP and non-TEEP divisions. 
Figure 3.1—Histogram of school districts, by income category for TEEP and non-TEEP groups 
Source: Census 2000 Municipality Income Classifications. 













Source: Census 2000 Municipality Income Classifications. 
For TEEP implementation information, we have the Division Education Development Plan data, 
which was part of the TEEP completion reports. This dataset has aggregated TEEP inputs during SY 
2000/01 to SY 2004/05. However, it does not identify implementation timing and inputs of different 
components of TEEP. Furthermore, the completeness and quality of the data substantially vary across 
divisions. To overcome this gap in the data, we visited 23 TEEP division offices to find the raw data on 
TEEP investments. The raw data we collected reveal details of different TEEP investments: textbooks, 
training, school-based management, school building, school innovation and improvement fund, 
equipment/furniture, and supplementary instructional materials. For training, we identified the starting 
date of teacher training and calculated the total number of man-hours spent in training during SY 2000/01 
to SY 2004/05 by different categories. For textbooks, we identified investment amounts (quantity and 
cost by grade and subject) in each school year. Similarly, we sorted school building projects by 
completion year and identified new construction and renovation cases and their aggregate total values by 
school. 
Table 3.2 describes the initial implementation timing of different TEEP components: school 
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6 
of schools covered under TEEP in Visayas (our analysis is restricted to this area) from SY 2000/01 
through SY 2005/06. In school buildings, we aggregated new construction and renovation projects by 
their completion timings. In textbooks, we used timing in which textbooks (disaggregated by grade and 
subject) were distributed to schools. In teacher training, we only used the initial time when training was 
introduced. Note that training covers a wide range of contents, which principals and teachers studied step-
by-step. In many cases, training was conducted at the school district level. This means that instructors 
visit districts one by one within a division, and therefore it took them a few years to cover all the topics 
(our data show only total man-hours and the start date). The table shows that by SY 2002/03, about 80 
percent of schools had received textbooks and 50 percent had at least one completed school building 
project. In all schools, the training process had just begun. 














  (percent) 
New construction and renovation projects  6  22  49  63  84  86 
Grade 1 textbook distribution  76  76  81  100  100  100 
Grade 2 textbook distribution  76  76  81  100  100  100 
Grade 3 textbook distribution  76  76  81  81  81  100 
Grade 4 textbook distribution  76  76  81  100  100  100 
Grade 5 textbook distribution  76  76  81  100  100  100 
Grade 6 textbook distribution  69  69  74  100  100  100 
Training program of teachers  31  99  100  100  100  100 
Source: TEEP investment database (the authors’ survey), and Division Education Development Plan database.  
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4.  ESTIMATION METHOD 
Because the original phase-in plan of TEEP was not followed in practice, we cannot explore the pipeline 
design to identify the impact of TEEP on school performance. Therefore, we formed a control group 
based on the schools in the non-TEEP provinces to estimate the counterfactual of the treatment group, 
which are the schools in the TEEP provinces. Double differences (DD) based on the cohort panel from 
grade 4 (SY 2002/03) and grade 6 (SY 2004/05) is used to eliminate cohort-specific fixed effects.
8  
Because the allocation of TEEP was purposive, the initial school conditions are likely to have 
different distributions in the treatment and control groups. If the initial conditions affect subsequent 
changes of the outcome variables, DD would give a biased estimate of the TEEP impacts. We use two 
strategies to deal with the potential bias due to nonrandom program placement. First, we use the sample 
from Visayas only. As shown in Figure 2.1, TEEP divisions are relatively evenly distributed throughout 
Visayas compared with the other two macroregions. We therefore expect that the TEEP and non-TEEP 
provinces are more comparable in Visayas, and hence our extra data collection and cleaning efforts were 
focused on Visayas. Second, we use propensity score (PS) matching to balance observable cohort 
characteristics and initial conditions between the treated and the control groups. 
Three caveats exist in our method. First, our baseline is not free of contamination. Table 3.1 
showed that TEEP had been implemented in all treated schools by SY 2002/03. Thus, the initial level of 
test scores in the treatment group reflects earlier investments completed before SY 2002/03. Second, it is 
possible that students from primary schools, which are not part of our sample, came into grades 5 and 6 in 
our sample elementary schools, which alters the student body at grade 5. Since TEEP also contributed to 
the conversion of primary schools to elementary schools by building new classrooms and staffing for 
grades 5 and 6, it is possible that attrition is different in the treated and control groups.
9 Third, as an 
observational analysis, we cannot eliminate bias due to time-variant unobservables.  
To illustrate our empirical approach, let   if a cohort is treated (located in TEEP area) and 
 if a cohort is not treated (located in non-TEEP area). Let the outcome of being treated by TEEP 
and the counterfactual outcome at time   be denoted by (𝑌 𝑡
𝑇,𝑌 𝑡
𝐶). The gain from treatment is (𝑌 𝑡
𝑇 − 𝑌 𝑡
𝐶), 
and we are interested in the average effect of treatment on the treated (ATET), 𝐸(𝑌 𝑡
𝑇 − 𝑌 𝑡
𝐶|𝐷𝑡 = 1). With 
𝑡 = 1 denoting SY 2004/05 and 𝑡 = 0 denoting SY 2002/03, we can write the standard DD estimator as 
𝐷𝐷 = 𝐸�𝑌 1
𝑇 − 𝑌 0
𝐶|𝐷 = 1� − 𝐸�𝑌 1
𝐶 − 𝑌 0
𝐶|𝐷 = 0� = 𝐸�𝑌 1
𝑇 − 𝑌 1
𝐶|𝐷 = 1� + 𝐵1 − 𝐵0, 
where 𝐵𝑡 is the selection bias and 𝐵𝑡 = 𝐸(𝑌 𝑡
𝐶|𝐷 = 1) − 𝐸(𝑌 𝑡
𝐶|𝐷 = 0). If the selection bias is constant 
over time (𝐵1 = 𝐵0), the DD estimator yields an unbiased estimate of the actual program impact.  
The condition 𝐵1 = 𝐵0 or 𝐸�𝑌 1
𝐶 − 𝑌 0
𝐶|𝐷 = 1� = 𝐸�𝑌 1
𝐶 − 𝑌 0
𝐶|𝐷 = 0� will not hold if the cohort 
characteristics or initial conditions affect subsequent changes of the outcome variables and have different 
distributions in the treatment and control groups. To account for this, we use PS matching to balance 
cohort characteristics and initial conditions. The assumption underlying PS matching is that, conditional 
on observables, 𝑋, the outcome change if not treated is independent of the actual treatment; that is,  
�(𝑌 1
𝐶 − 𝑌 0
𝐶) ⊥ 𝐷|𝑋�. This has been shown to imply �(𝑌 1
𝐶 − 𝑌 0
𝐶) ⊥ 𝐷|𝑃(𝑋)�, where P(X) is the propensity 
score, defined as P(X) = Pr(D = 1|X) (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983). 
We use a PS-matched kernel method and a PS-weighted regression method (Hirano, Imbens, and 
Ridder 2003). The PS-matched method estimates  
                                                       
8 Due to delayed preparations at the early stage of TEEP, most of the program schools received investments during or after 
SY 2002/03. 
9 In SY 2002/03, total grade 5 enrollment was 94.1 percent of the total grade 4 enrollment in TEEP schools on average, 
compared with 95.4 percent in non-TEEP schools; and the total grade 6 enrollment was 94.6 percent of the total grade 5 
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where G(.) is a kernel function and bn is a bandwidth parameter. We use bootstrapping with 100 
replications to estimate the standard errors for the PS-matched kernel method. We choose the PS-matched 
kernel method instead of the more commonly used nearest-neighbor matching to obtain valid 
bootstrapped standard errors (Abadie and Imbens 2006a, 2006b). 
The PS-weighted method recovers an estimate of the ATET as the parameter β in a weighted least 
square regression of the form  
  ∆𝑌 𝑖 = 𝗼 + 𝗽𝐷𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,  (3) 
where weights equal 1 for treated and  )] ( ˆ 1 /[ ) ( ˆ X P X P −  for nontreated observations. See Chen, Mu, 
and Ravallion (2009) for empirical applications of these two methods. 
Since ATET can be estimated consistently only in the common support region of X, the choice of 
trimming method is important. We follow Crump et al. (2009) to determine the common support region 
by  
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This method minimizes the variance of the estimated ATET.  
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5.  AVERAGE TREATMENT EFFECTS 
In the estimation, we merged NAT grade 4 in SY 2002/03 and NAT grade 6 in SY 2004/05 using 
elementary schools in SY 2002/03.
10 Although the selection of TEEP is based on province-level poverty 
indicators summarized in the Social Reform Agenda, we conjecture that income distributions overlap 
between TEEP and non-TEEP school districts (see Figures 3.1 and 3.2). In our matching estimation, we 
control for the interactions of municipality income category and regional dummies, as well as school-
level initial conditions including pupil–teacher ratio, grade 4 total enrollment, number of multigrade 
classes, and proportion of locally funded teachers. In the Philippine context, local income level not only 
summarizes broad socioeconomic factors but also proxies the availability of private schools, which affects 
the competition between public and private schools and therefore the ability distribution of students in 
public schools (see, for example, Yamauchi 2005). It also controls local labor market conditions.  
The first-stage logit regression result is reported in Table 5.1. The dependent variable is 1 if the 
school is located in a TEEP area and zero otherwise. The results show that income categories, 
distinguished by regions, significantly explain TEEP placement. Except for income category 5, which is 
the poorest group, the effect is monotonic. In eastern Visayas, which is omitted as the benchmark case, 
the effect of income category 5 is negative. In other regions, western and central Visayas, the income 
effect is monotonic throughout all income classes.  
The pseudo R-squared of the logit regression is 0.22, which suggests plausible explanatory 
power. The PS of each observation is estimated based on the regression. Appendix Figure A.1 plots 
densities of the estimated PS in the treatment and control groups as well as the cut-point of the PS values 
above which observations are trimmed. To illustrate the effects of trimming and reweighting, Appendix 
Table A.1 displays simple differences of the explanatory variables between the treatment and control 
groups in the untrimmed sample and the PS weighted and trimmed samples. Although simple differences 
between the groups are large and statistically significant in the untrimmed sample, trimming and 
matching based on the propensity score eliminates all significant differences. 
In Table 5.2, we report the estimation results on ATET of TEEP. We examine changes in overall 
and mathematics NAT scores from grade 4 in SY 2002/03 to grade 6 in SY 2004/05.
11 Panel 1 shows the 
simple DD results for the overall test and mathematics test scores. The effects on both scores are small in 
magnitude and insignificant statistically. Panels 2 and 3 show the results using DD and PS matching 
(weighted regression) and DD and PS matching (kernel), respectively. The two methods give close 
results, which suggests that TEEP has significant impacts on both overall and mathematics scores. The 
magnitude is about 4 overall and 5 for mathematics. In other words, TEEP attributes to an increase of 
about 6 percent in the overall test score and 8 percent in the mathematics score on average.
12 The impact 
is not trivial over the two-year period. If the impact can continue at the same rate, the total effect of TEEP 
over six years (if students are exposed to TEEP in the entire elementary school period) would be a score 
increase of about 12 to 15 points. This magnitude of performance improvement is substantial. We note 
that the DD and PS matching estimates of the TEEP impacts are larger than the simple DD estimates, 
which implies that the endogenous allocation of TEEP creates downward bias in the estimates if the 
program allocation is not taken into account. That is, it is likely that TEEP schools (and school districts) 
would tend to have a lower trend in NAT than non-TEEP schools if TEEP were not in place. 
   
                                                       
10 Our analysis pertains only to elementary schools in SY 2002/03, which offered grades 1 to 6. To maintain a valid cohort, 
we dropped primary schools, where only grades 1 to 4 are taught.  
11 Mathematics is the only common subject that was tested by all schools in the two grades. Overall score is the summation 
of scores of all the subjects being tested.  
12 This is computed by dividing the estimated ATET of TEEP by the counterfactual average score of the trimmed treatment 
group in SY 2004/05.  
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Table 5.1—Logit estimation of TEEP placement 
TEEP  Coefficient  Standard error 
Central Visayas   –2.161  0.211*** 
Western Visayas   –2.518  0.226*** 
Income 2   1.341  0.308*** 
Income 3   1.702  0.370*** 
Income 4  0.306  0.190 
Income 5   0.141  0.186 
Central Visayas × Income 2   –1.337  0.419*** 
Central Visayas × Income 3   –1.097  0.425*** 
Central Visayas × Income 4   0.330  0.259 
Central Visayas × Income 5  –1.980  0.388*** 
Western Visayas × Income 2   –0.784  0.397** 
Western Visayas × Income 3   –0.911  0.426** 
Western Visayas × Income 4   1.325  0.264*** 
Western Visayas × Income 5   0.954  0.312*** 
Pupil–teacher ratio (both local and national)   –0.008  0.004* 
Grade 4 total enrollment (in ages 6 to 11)  –0.008  0.001*** 
Number of multigrade classes  –0.042  0.040 
Proportion of local funded teachers   0.203  0.596 
Constant  1.304  0.212*** 
Number of observations  4,208   
Pseudo R2   0.22    
Source:  National Achievement Test  database, TEEP investment database (the authors’ survey), Division Education 
Development Plan database, Basic Education Information System database, Census 2000 Municipality Income Classifications. 
Note: *** significant at the 1 percent level, ** significant at the 5 perecent level, * significant at the 10 percent level. 
Table 5.2—Impacts of TEEP on school performance 
  Untrimmed sample, simple DD 
  Treated diff  Control diff  DD  s.e.  sig. 
Overall score  16.737  15.348  1.389  0.874   
Math score  17.645  16.385  1.260  1.090   
Number of observations  1,774  2,434          
   Trimmed sample, DD+PS weighted regression 
Overall score  16.074  12.139  3.934  1.129  *** 
Math score  16.961  11.719  5.242  1.473  *** 
Number of observations  1,541  2,408          
   Trimmed sample, DD+PS weighted kernel 
Overall score  16.074  12.260  3.813  1.172  *** 
Math score  16.961  11.961  5.000  1.442  *** 
Number of observations  1,541  2,408          
Source: National Achievement Test database, TEEP investment database (the authors’ survey), Division Education Development 
Plan database, Basic Education Information System database, Census 2000 Municipality Income Classifications. 
Notes: DD: double difference; PS: propensity score; diff: mean-difference; s.e.: standard errors; *** significant at the 1 percent 
level, ** significant at the 5 percent level, * significant at the 10 percent level.  
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6.  COMPONENT-WISE ANALYSIS 
The previous analysis suggests that TEEP, as a whole, has a significant effect on school performance. 
Because TEEP is a combination of several components, in this section we explore how each component 
contributes to school performance. To do so, we specify the empirical model as 
  ∆H = α + β1∆Textbook + β2∆Training + β3∆Building + zy + ε, 
where ∆H is the change in human capital (measured by test scores) from SY 2002/03 to SY 2004/05. 
∆Textbook, ∆Training, and ∆Building are TEEP investments in textbooks, teacher training, and building, 
respectively, that are expected to benefit the cohort under study.
13 Investments in textbooks include those 
for grades 4, 5, and 6 separately. Investments in training include instruction training and subjective 
training of teacher. Investments in building refer to the number of new school constructions and new 
renovations; z is a vector of the initial district- and school-level conditions including the interactions of 
municipality-level income categories and regional dummies, pupil–teacher ratio, grade 4 enrollment, 
number of multigrade classes, and proportion of local funded teachers. We note that the initial human 
capital and TEEP investments are potentially complementary (and thus not separable), but we assume that 
the initial school conditions are sufficient to control such heterogeneities in the intervention effect. 
The results are presented in Table 6.1, both for the entire sample and for the TEEP-only sample. 
The findings are summarized as follows: First, in the textbook effect, earlier stage investments seem very 
important in determining later stage outcomes. Grade 4 textbook affects student outcomes from grade 4 to 
grade 6 onward. This finding is consistent with the recently well established view on the cumulative 
process of human capital accumulation. Second, new classroom construction significantly helps improve 
their performance. The effect of renovations is also significant, although it has a much lower magnitude. 
Third, instructional training seems to have a greater positive effect on student performance than subject-
wise training (mathematics, English, and so forth). The latter has a negative effect on student 
performance, at least in the short run, probably because teachers have to use their teaching time to receive 
training. 
This analysis has some reservations. First, since our sample students (cohorts) are at grade 4 in 
SY 2002/03, we focus on textbooks for grades 4 to 6 distributed at TEEP. These students (cohorts) could 
have used TEEP textbooks at lower grades, but the impacts of the textbooks are already reflected in their 
NAT scores at SY 2002/03 (grade 4). Second, although we have information on school building project 
contract values, we use the number of new constructions and renovations because the contract value 
aggregates both types and we also conjecture that the impacts are different between new constructions 
and renovations. These conjectures were supported in preliminary analyses. 
Finally, in this study, we did not explicitly assess school-based management, mainly because we 
did not find appropriate input measures and variations. The batch plan was not strictly implemented, 
especially in the first and second batch groups (that is, they were mixed in reality, depending on the 
updated preparedness at the division level). This soft component is thought to improve the overall 
effectiveness of physical investments and teacher training. 
 
                                                       
13 For example, grade 4 textbook refers to the textbooks distributed to grade 4 in SY 2002/03. The grade 4 textbook 
distributed to grade 4 in SY 2003/04 is not counted because it did not benefit our cohort.  
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Table 6.1—Estimation results of component analysis, dependent variables being change in 
mathematics score and overall score 
  Mathematics score    Overall score 
  All sample  TEEP only    All sample  TEEP only 
Grade 4 textbooks (peso/pupil)  0.042***  0.015**    0.034***  0.014*** 
  (0.007)  (0.006)    (0.005)  (0.005) 
Grade 5 textbooks (peso/pupil)  –0.007  0.000    –0.005  –0.001 
  (0.005)  (0.005)    (0.004)  (0.004) 
Grade 6 textbooks (peso/pupil)  –0.003  –0.002    –0.004  –0.003 
  (0.005)  (0.005)    (0.004)  (0.004) 
Instructional training (man-hours/pupil)  0.475**  0.323*    0.417**  0.262* 
  (0.227)  (0.188)    (0.176)  (0.154) 
Subject training (man-hours/pupil)  –0.845**  –0.583*    –0.614**  –0.401 
  (0.325)  (0.301)    (0.258)  (0.250) 
New constructions (number in SY 2003/04)  5.785***  5.359***    5.418***  5.042*** 
  (1.917)  (1.968)    (1.104)  (1.115) 
New renovations (number in SY 2003/04)  1.513***  1.214**    1.139***  0.895** 
  (0.473)  (0.489)    (0.331)  (0.373) 
Central Visayas   7.179**  –3.530    3.206  –3.095 
  (3.264)  (3.989)    (2.722)  (3.907) 
Western Visayas   –0.548  –19.31    –0.200  –14.11*** 
  (3.398)  (3.341)    (2.786)  (2.872) 
Income 2   4.607  2.908    4.394  2.587 
  (3.662)  (3.976)    (3.132)  (3.325) 
Income 3   –2.813  –3.687    –1.825  –2.330 
  (3.383)  (3.410)    (2.766)  (2.844) 
Income 4  –0.665  –0.951    –1.036  –1.512 
  (3.297)  (3.510)    (2.677)  (2.971) 
Income 5   2.156  1.157    1.433  0.764 
  (2.967)  (3.154)    (2.449)  (2.701) 
Central Visayas × Income 2   –1.959  –2.931    –1.040  –4.883 
  (4.332)  (5.158)    (3.775)  (5.005) 
Central Visayas × Income 3   –0.244  –0.999    0.074  –0.842 
  (4.558)  (4.862)    (3.715)  (4.284) 
Central Visayas × Income 4   0.399  –4.303    0.711  –3.668 
  (4.019)  (5.442)    (3.246)  (4.843) 
Central Visayas × Income 5  0.050  –0.525    0.361  –1.261 
  (3.697)  (5.500)    (3.132)  (4.408) 
Western Visayas × Income 2   –1.071  8.097    –0.273  6.017 
  (4.713)  (3.929)    (3.988)  (3.651) 
Western Visayas × Income 3   2.603  17.914    1.831  12.65*** 
  (4.172)  (4.981)    (3.351)  (4.017) 
Western Visayas × Income 4   0.785  13.628    2.081  11.89*** 
  (3.990)  (4.421)    (3.238)  (3.652) 
Western Visayas × Income 5   2.174  10.673    2.523  9.84*** 
  (4.486)  (4.080)    (3.533)  (3.365) 
Pupil teacher ratio   –0.117**  –0.126    –0.098**  –0.155** 
  (0.049)  (0.076)    (0.040)  (0.062) 
Grade 4 total enrollment   0.048  0.058    0.047***  0.061*** 
  (0.010)  (0.018)    (0.008)  (0.015) 
Number of multigrade classes  –0.441  –0.116    –0.487*  0.161 
  (0.373)  (0.604)    (0.283)  (0.461) 
Proportion of local funded teachers   –11.855*  –6.273    –8.36  –9.54 
  (6.805)  (14.301)    (5.56)  (11.87) 
Constant  15.40***  21.38***    15.11***  20.76*** 
  (3.292)  (3.694)    (2.66)  (3.055) 
Number of observations  3,891  1,471    3,891  1,471 
R-squared   0.061  0.089    0.062  0.114 
Source: National Achievement Test  database, TEEP investment database (the authors’ survey), Division Education Development 
Plan database, Basic Education Information System database, Census 2000 Municipality Income Classifications. 
Note: Pesos are in Philippine pesos (PHP). Standard errors are in parentheses. *** significant at the 1 percent level, ** significant 
at the 5 percent level, * significant at the 10 percent level. 
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7.  CONCLUSION 
This paper provided evidence from the Philippines that both physical and soft components of public 
school education investments significantly increased student test scores, by about 12–15 score points in 
the National Achievement Test (NAT) with the six-year exposure. Our study also showed that the 
performance in mathematics is more positively responsive to education reform and investments than other 
subjects.  
Second, we also found evidence that early-stage investments improve student performance at 
later stages in the elementary school cycle. The distribution of grade 4 textbooks is shown to increase 
subsequent student test scores more than grade 5 or grade 6 textbooks do. This is not surprising, due to 
the cumulative nature of knowledge acquisition (not just in education), but this dynamic production 
cannot be identified without exogenous variations in the inputs. Our results imply that improved 
educational quality at the elementary school stage has positive impacts on educational progress at later 
stages.  
The above findings, when combined with evidence in the literature, imply that public investments 
in elementary education likely have positive longer-term impacts on education performance at the 
subsequent stages: for example, progression to high schools and colleges and academic performance. If 
so, social returns to an early-stage investment can be greater than what the current study seems to show. 
This argument justifies large public investments to improve school quality at the early stage of public 
education, because the cumulative benefits are gradually realized at later stages in the education system 
and labor markets. 
The competition between public and private schools is a unique feature of the Philippine 
education system due to the historical dominance of private institutions. In this context, some studies 
support an ability-screening hypothesis that private schools screen high-ability students but their actual 
schooling investments are not contributing to productivity increase (see, for example, Yamauchi 2005). 
The ability screening with the private–public competition, given high costs of private schools, is socially 
inefficient. If publicly subsidized and high-quality education is available, we also expect the inflow of 
good students into the public school system in the long run.  
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APPENDIX: SUPPLEMENTARY TABLE AND FIGURE 
Table A.1—Balance check 
  Untrimmed sample    Trimmed sample    Trimmed sample 
  Simple DD 
  DD+PS weighted 
regression 
  DD+PS weighted 
kernel 
   Diff.  s.e.  Sig.    Diff.  s.e.  Sig.    Diff3  s.e.3  Sig.3 
Central Visayas   –0.287  0.047  ***    –0.004  0.046      –0.010  0.046   
Western Visayas   –0.144  0.050  ***    0.000  0.055      –0.003  0.057   
Income 2   0.012  0.032      0.002  0.017      –0.004  0.022   
Income 3   –0.012  0.040      0.000  0.035      –0.004  0.034   
Income 4  0.108  0.050  **    0.004  0.062      0.022  0.060   
Income 5   0.021  0.039      –0.001  0.054      0.000  0.041   
Central Visayas × Income 2   –0.024  0.015      0.000  0.010      –0.002  0.011   
Central Visayas × Income 3   –0.026  0.026      –0.001  0.025      –0.002  0.028   
Central Visayas × Income 4   –0.048  0.033      –0.002  0.032      0.001  0.038   
Central Visayas × Income 5  –0.101  0.020  ***    0.000  0.005      –0.002  0.005   
Western Visayas × Income 2   –0.032  0.019  *    0.000  0.014      –0.004  0.014   
Western Visayas × Income 3   –0.041  0.027      0.000  0.025      –0.003  0.027   
Western Visayas × Income 4   0.026  0.038      0.001  0.047      0.003  0.044   
Western Visayas × Income 5   –0.008  0.014      –0.001  0.014      0.004  0.014   
Pupil–teacher ratio  –2.254  0.758  ***    –1.101  0.847      –1.306  0.930   
Grade 4 total enrollment   –7.475  1.325  ***    0.687  1.198      0.511  1.257   
Number of multigrade classes  0.134  0.050  ***    –0.037  0.077      –0.038  0.090   
Proportion of local funded teachers   –0.005  0.003      –0.001  0.004      0.000  0.004   
Number of observations  4,208        3,949        3,949     
Source: National Achievement Test database, TEEP investment database (the authors’ survey), Division Education Development 
Plan database, Basic Education Information System database, Census 2000 Municipality Income Classifications. 
Notes: DD: Double difference, PS: Propensity score, s.e.: Standard errors, diff: mean-difference, *** significant at the 1 percent 
level, ** significant at the 5 percent level, * significant at the 10 percent level.  
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Figure A.1—Plot of estimated propensity scores for schools in non-TEEP and TEEP areas 
 
Source: National Achievement Test  database, TEEP investment database (the authors’ survey), Division Education Development 
Plan database, Basic Education Information System database, Census 2000 Municipality Income Classifications.  
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